The root held five documents of two different kinds with nothing to tell
them apart. This repo is being handed over as both design spec and
as-built record, so the two are now separated by lifetime:
spec/ BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md, YAU_Linux_Host_Onboarding.md
normative and durable - what we agreed to build
status/ workflow-map.html, current-state.html, REQUESTS.md
snapshots that go stale and get edited constantly
Nothing mechanical moved. The twelve code folders are deployment
interface - compose builds from /home/azureuser/ai/api, /web, /ingest and
deploy.sh copies from $HOME/ai/compose, /cube/model, /db - so they stay
where they are. CLAUDE.md stays at root because Claude Code loads it from
there, as do .gitignore and .gitattributes, which only apply repo-wide
from the root.
All 26 references to the build spec were bare filenames in prose, so the
move broke no mechanism. The seven markdown links in README.md and the
two pointers at the top of CLAUDE.md are repointed.
docs/ is deleted. It only ever held .gitkeep - nothing mounted or read
it, and ingest reads the host path /datadisk/ai-docs mounted at /docs
inside the container. An empty docs/ invites the misreading "project
documentation goes here". The ignore rule stays, now covering the whole
folder, so a controlled document dropped there still cannot be committed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The three open Phase 5 findings were one defect: the stand-in was keyed on
CI Server POINT names (PS_STN_WET_WELL_LEVEL) when the historian is keyed on
CI Server ITEM names (AID.WRPS.STN.LEVEL). Modbus carries register numbers,
not names, so those two layers are free to differ - and do. Reconciling
against the register map, as planned, would only have proved the first three
namespaces agreed with each other.
Rebuilt from WRPS/05-scada/modbus, so item names, sample rates, retention and
timestamp semantics come from the machine rather than from a guess.
(a) Level tag does not join. PS_STN_WET_WELL_LEVEL becomes a tag row in its
own right; LIT-101 is marked NOT HISTORISED - a field input on %IW0 that
never reaches SCADA. It was the only seed row carrying two addresses.
public.historian_items holds the item-to-tag mapping, generated by
scripts/gen_historian_items.py and enforced non-empty at generate, at
deploy and at verify.
(b) first_alarm/last_alarm returned UTC. Converted inside the measure, so it
stays in Cube and happens once. Aggregate first, convert after - the other
order picks the wrong row across a DST fall-back. Returned as a formatted
string with a companion site_timezone measure. Storage being UTC is now
confirmed, not assumed: all 49 points carry TIME_ZONE "Date+time GMT" and
every history group CORRECT_DAYLIGHT=0. This answers Phase 4 task 4.
(c) High level alarm filed against the wrong equipment. Both sides were right
about different things; the defect was asserting equipment twice. The
history now carries no equipment column at all - faithful, since CI
Server's section tree stops at the station and three pumps. Equipment is
reached bit -> tag -> equipment via public.alarm_bits.
Alarms are derived, not stored: CI Server's ALARM_HISTORY group is empty
because every item imports with alarming off. Decomposing the alarm word needs
no configuration that does not exist.
Three things the SCADA config changed that were never filed as faults:
- retention is 7 days, not 30. The advisory path was reporting a month of
evidence drawn from a week of data
- the analogue rate is 5 s, not 60. Two measures multiplied sample counts by
a hardcoded 60 - a twelvefold overstatement that read as plausible
- the deadband warning in process_values.yml was wrong and was steering
people away from the correct measure
db/002_fixtures.sql now asserts its own counts at load and cross-checks the
alarm derivation against two independent signals. Those prove the pipeline,
not the plant.
db/README-standin-historian.md documents removal: the seam between generation
and contract, and twelve assumptions about imh that are NOT confirmed. Two of
them fail silently.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
An operator standing at the SCADA console should not complete a Duo push to
ask a question, and nobody outside the plant should reach the assistant at
all. The ai.yokogawa.tech Caddy block now admits remote_ip 10.0.0.21
(yau-poc-cicore1, static) and returns 403 to everything else. Applied on
lin001 2026-08-28; snapshot at ~/Caddyfile.bak-ai-scadaonly-20260828.
This also settles why the console could not reach the assistant at all:
auth.yokogawa.tech has no pinpoint record on the DC, so a LAN browser got a
correct 302 to the portal and then died on DNS. It went unnoticed because the
device agents write to Influx over the /api/v2/write MFA bypass and never
touch the portal - no browser had ever hit Authelia from inside the VNet.
Verified before applying that an IP matcher can work here: Caddy sees real
client addresses, and WireGuard peers arrive masqueraded as 172.19.0.6 so
they do not match and are refused along with the internet.
What this costs, recorded in section 14 as a shortcut and not as a security
control: it is an IP allowlist on a flat network with no OT/IT boundary, so
anything that can take 10.0.0.21 inherits unauthenticated access; Langfuse
traces are now anonymous, so there is no record of who asked what; and the
assistant is out of browser reach over the VPN. It is in scope for the
section 2 OT/safety review, which is still outstanding.
api.yokogawa.tech is unchanged and still fully gated - Phase 9 publishing
depends on Remote-User/Remote-Groups and stays there. The now-inert
ai.yokogawa.tech entry in the Authelia rule is deliberately left in place so
restoring the gate is a Caddy reload rather than an Authelia restart that
logs out every user on the host.
verify.sh treats 403-from-lin001 as the pass for the deny arm and states
plainly that the allow arm can only be proved from cicore1.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operators cannot add a document today: ingestion is CLI-only, needs a host
login and a TTY for confirm_header(), /datadisk/ai-docs is mounted read-only,
ai-api has no identity, and nothing in the stack has a role that can write
doc_chunks. This designs the way in, the way out, and control over what is in
the retrieval pool. Design and schema only - no router, worker or UI code yet.
Documents in (16.1-16.9, db/004):
upload -> pre-scan -> review -> approve -> published, with the header
confirmation moved from a terminal prompt to a review screen and recorded
rather than discarded. A CHECK constraint refuses an approved row without a
confirmed number, revision and effective date, so an API bug cannot skip it.
Three roles: agent_ro unchanged, uploads_rw writes the queue only, ingest_rw
writes doc_chunks and has no HTTP surface.
Documents out (16.10-16.11, db/005):
--supersede needs a revision to keep, so a cancelled procedure cannot be
withdrawn at all. Adds withdraw (immediate, reversible, audited), restore
(refused while another revision is live) and purge (off by default). A
column grant plus a trigger let the web-facing role make a document less
citable and never more.
The pool (16.13-16.15, db/006):
pool_enabled, orthogonal to superseded: one is a claim about the document,
the other about the corpus. Retrieval requires both, so re-enabling a
withdrawn document does not make it citable. Named profiles and a
per-request override let a demo trim the corpus without mutating state on a
shared live host, and every reduced-pool answer carries a banner with the
document count, following the used_fixture_data precedent.
Two existing defects found and documented while designing this:
- ai-ingest takes PGUSER=agent_ro from api.env, a SELECT-only role, so the
Phase 3 command in the README cannot write doc_chunks (16.1).
- ingest_file() always inserts superseded = FALSE, so `--all` re-ingests a
superseded revision as live. --supersede survives only until the next bulk
run (16.10).
One commit rather than three: the upload, withdrawal and pool designs
interleave in the same spec, README and compose files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified on lin001 over SSH on 2026-08-20, read-only:
- Port 502 is bound to 10.0.0.17, not 0.0.0.0, so unauthenticated Modbus is
not internet-reachable at the Docker level. This was an open risk in §3 and
an unchecked item in §15; it is now a confirmation. openplc-runtime also
publishes 8443 (the Runtime web UI) on the same private address, which the
spec did not mention.
- openplc-runtime is not the only published port on the host: caddy, wireguard,
mosquitto and chirpstack-gateway-bridge all publish on 0.0.0.0. The
no-published-ports rule still applies in full to what we build, but the
"one deliberate exception" framing was wrong and invited over-reading.
- Port 22 is open to the internet. Added to §15 as an open item for the same
NSG review.
- 21 containers running, not 22; no stopped containers.
- /datadisk is 46% used with InfluxDB at 55 GB, up from 43%/52 GB. Recorded
the growth rate so it can be budgeted for.
CLAUDE.md restates two of these rules and is updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Build spec and host brief carried in from C:\Claude and WRPS/02-env; the
plant model (equipment, tags, alarm bitmask, enums, unit conversions) is
derived from WRPS/04-plc/register-map.csv, WRPS/05-scada/modbus/scada-points.csv
and WRPS-CTL-003.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
