The design commit added ai-docs-worker with no profile and an inbox mount on
ai-api. Both take effect the moment anyone deploys, and neither has the code or
the directories behind it yet:
- ai-compose.yml's own header says to run a bare `up -d`. That would start
ai-docs-worker with entrypoint `python worker.py` - a file that does not
exist - under restart: unless-stopped, so it crash-loops on a live shared
host that also runs the demo PLC.
- Docker creates a missing bind source as a ROOT-OWNED directory. ai-api does
not run as root, so deploying the inbox mount before the directory exists
gives the API an inbox it cannot write to, on the growing disk.
So: profiles: [worker] on the worker, matching the ai-ingest precedent, and the
ai-api volume block commented out with the install command beside it - the same
"add each piece at the phase that needs it" convention as caddy/ai-routes.caddy.
A bare `up -d` from main now starts exactly what it started before: pg-ai, cube,
ai-api, ai-web.
Both guards come off in the commit that adds worker.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A single-page explainer for people who will not read the build spec: how a
question becomes an answer, the four lanes and why they are separate, the four
tools the assistant may reach for, where the knowledge comes from, and what is
live against what is only built. Status snapshot as observed on the host,
21 August 2026.
Kept at the repository root beside the other narrative documents rather than in
docs/, which is gitignored and holds controlled plant documents. Listed in the
layout sections of README.md and the build spec so it is findable.
Note: it predates Phase 9 and so does not mention operator document upload,
withdrawal or pool curation. Its step table stops at 8.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Operators cannot add a document today: ingestion is CLI-only, needs a host
login and a TTY for confirm_header(), /datadisk/ai-docs is mounted read-only,
ai-api has no identity, and nothing in the stack has a role that can write
doc_chunks. This designs the way in, the way out, and control over what is in
the retrieval pool. Design and schema only - no router, worker or UI code yet.
Documents in (16.1-16.9, db/004):
upload -> pre-scan -> review -> approve -> published, with the header
confirmation moved from a terminal prompt to a review screen and recorded
rather than discarded. A CHECK constraint refuses an approved row without a
confirmed number, revision and effective date, so an API bug cannot skip it.
Three roles: agent_ro unchanged, uploads_rw writes the queue only, ingest_rw
writes doc_chunks and has no HTTP surface.
Documents out (16.10-16.11, db/005):
--supersede needs a revision to keep, so a cancelled procedure cannot be
withdrawn at all. Adds withdraw (immediate, reversible, audited), restore
(refused while another revision is live) and purge (off by default). A
column grant plus a trigger let the web-facing role make a document less
citable and never more.
The pool (16.13-16.15, db/006):
pool_enabled, orthogonal to superseded: one is a claim about the document,
the other about the corpus. Retrieval requires both, so re-enabling a
withdrawn document does not make it citable. Named profiles and a
per-request override let a demo trim the corpus without mutating state on a
shared live host, and every reduced-pool answer carries a banner with the
document count, following the used_fixture_data precedent.
Two existing defects found and documented while designing this:
- ai-ingest takes PGUSER=agent_ro from api.env, a SELECT-only role, so the
Phase 3 command in the README cannot write doc_chunks (16.1).
- ingest_file() always inserts superseded = FALSE, so `--all` re-ingests a
superseded revision as live. --supersede survives only until the next bulk
run (16.10).
One commit rather than three: the upload, withdrawal and pool designs
interleave in the same spec, README and compose files.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Bind address, and the reason this matters most. Langfuse is a Next.js
standalone server: it binds to whatever $HOSTNAME resolves to, not to all
interfaces. The container is on two networks and its hostname resolved to the
proxy address, so it listened on proxy only - HTTP 200 from proxy, HTTP 000
from ai-internal. Caddy is on proxy, so the public URL worked perfectly and
nothing looked wrong, but ai-api runs on ai-internal and every trace it sent
would have failed silently in Phase 6. HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0 fixes it; both
networks now return 200.
External network name. ai-internal does not exist - Compose created it as
azureuser_ai-internal under the host's shared project name. Verified both ways
on the host: with name: a container joins and reaches pg-ai, without it up
fails with "network ai-internal declared as external, but could not be found".
Healthcheck. Was probing localhost, which failed for the bind reason above and
marked the container unhealthy while it served fine. Restored to 127.0.0.1,
which now works because the bind is genuinely fixed rather than worked around.
Signup policy. AUTH_DISABLE_SIGNUP false. Langfuse keeps its own user table
behind Authelia; closed signup with no seeded user means nobody can log in at
all. Accepted for the PoC because Authelia is the real gate - revisit before
handover.
Phase 2 gate passed on the host with these applied: 302 to the auth portal,
certificate issued, AD + Duo login confirmed, and a test trace verified in the
database rather than trusted from the API response.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
agent_ro could still create temporary tables: Postgres grants TEMP on every
database to PUBLIC, and revoking it from the role alone does not remove what
PUBLIC grants. Revoke it from PUBLIC too. postgres is a superuser and keeps
its temp tables, so the seed load is unaffected.
Nothing but the superuser could read schema fixture: 003_roles.sql grants only
on schema public, and the fixture schema is created afterwards. Grant read to
agent_ro and cube_rw. The grants live in 002_fixtures.sql because that file
opens with DROP SCHEMA fixture CASCADE, which would destroy grants held
anywhere else on every fixture reload.
Both re-verified on pg-ai: 11/11 privilege tests and 10/10 fixture access
tests pass, reads work for both roles, writes are rejected for both.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Verified on lin001 over SSH on 2026-08-20, read-only:
- Port 502 is bound to 10.0.0.17, not 0.0.0.0, so unauthenticated Modbus is
not internet-reachable at the Docker level. This was an open risk in §3 and
an unchecked item in §15; it is now a confirmation. openplc-runtime also
publishes 8443 (the Runtime web UI) on the same private address, which the
spec did not mention.
- openplc-runtime is not the only published port on the host: caddy, wireguard,
mosquitto and chirpstack-gateway-bridge all publish on 0.0.0.0. The
no-published-ports rule still applies in full to what we build, but the
"one deliberate exception" framing was wrong and invited over-reading.
- Port 22 is open to the internet. Added to §15 as an open item for the same
NSG review.
- 21 containers running, not 22; no stopped containers.
- /datadisk is 46% used with InfluxDB at 55 GB, up from 43%/52 GB. Recorded
the growth rate so it can be budgeted for.
CLAUDE.md restates two of these rules and is updated to match.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authored on Windows, deployed to Ubuntu: a CRLF shell script fails on the
host with an unhelpful error.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Build spec and host brief carried in from C:\Claude and WRPS/02-env; the
plant model (equipment, tags, alarm bitmask, enums, unit conversions) is
derived from WRPS/04-plc/register-map.csv, WRPS/05-scada/modbus/scada-points.csv
and WRPS-CTL-003.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
