yau-plant-assistant/README.md
Claude 8aba1f7f5c Rebuild the stand-in historian on CI Server item names
The three open Phase 5 findings were one defect: the stand-in was keyed on
CI Server POINT names (PS_STN_WET_WELL_LEVEL) when the historian is keyed on
CI Server ITEM names (AID.WRPS.STN.LEVEL). Modbus carries register numbers,
not names, so those two layers are free to differ - and do. Reconciling
against the register map, as planned, would only have proved the first three
namespaces agreed with each other.

Rebuilt from WRPS/05-scada/modbus, so item names, sample rates, retention and
timestamp semantics come from the machine rather than from a guess.

(a) Level tag does not join. PS_STN_WET_WELL_LEVEL becomes a tag row in its
    own right; LIT-101 is marked NOT HISTORISED - a field input on %IW0 that
    never reaches SCADA. It was the only seed row carrying two addresses.
    public.historian_items holds the item-to-tag mapping, generated by
    scripts/gen_historian_items.py and enforced non-empty at generate, at
    deploy and at verify.

(b) first_alarm/last_alarm returned UTC. Converted inside the measure, so it
    stays in Cube and happens once. Aggregate first, convert after - the other
    order picks the wrong row across a DST fall-back. Returned as a formatted
    string with a companion site_timezone measure. Storage being UTC is now
    confirmed, not assumed: all 49 points carry TIME_ZONE "Date+time GMT" and
    every history group CORRECT_DAYLIGHT=0. This answers Phase 4 task 4.

(c) High level alarm filed against the wrong equipment. Both sides were right
    about different things; the defect was asserting equipment twice. The
    history now carries no equipment column at all - faithful, since CI
    Server's section tree stops at the station and three pumps. Equipment is
    reached bit -> tag -> equipment via public.alarm_bits.

Alarms are derived, not stored: CI Server's ALARM_HISTORY group is empty
because every item imports with alarming off. Decomposing the alarm word needs
no configuration that does not exist.

Three things the SCADA config changed that were never filed as faults:
  - retention is 7 days, not 30. The advisory path was reporting a month of
    evidence drawn from a week of data
  - the analogue rate is 5 s, not 60. Two measures multiplied sample counts by
    a hardcoded 60 - a twelvefold overstatement that read as plausible
  - the deadband warning in process_values.yml was wrong and was steering
    people away from the correct measure

db/002_fixtures.sql now asserts its own counts at load and cross-checks the
alarm derivation against two independent signals. Those prove the pipeline,
not the plant.

db/README-standin-historian.md documents removal: the seam between generation
and contract, and twelve assumptions about imh that are NOT confirmed. Two of
them fail silently.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-31 11:42:02 +10:00

23 KiB
Raw Blame History

WRPS Plant Operations Assistant

A proof-of-concept assistant that lets an operator at the Waterloo Road Pump Station ask a question in plain English and get an answer grounded in plant data and controlled documents.

Example question Class
"How many times did the wet well high level alarm come up last week?" Historical
"What does the level signal fault alarm on the wet well mean?" Reference
"How do I lift the interlock on Pump 02?" Procedural
"What discharge rate should we run to avoid spilling?" Advisory

Those four need different retrieval paths, different answer contracts and different safety rules. One generic pipeline covering all four is the main way this project fails.

Success is a correct, citable, appropriately-scoped answer. Fluency is not success.


Read this before writing any code

This is an information retrieval and analysis assistant. It is not a control system, not an advisory controller, and not a substitute for a competent person.

It does not issue instructions for safety-critical actions. For "how do I lift the interlock on Pump 02" it locates and cites the controlled procedure. An interlock exists because somebody assessed a hazard; a bypass procedure reassembled from retrieved fragments is a safety document nobody approved.

It does not recommend setpoints or operating parameters. For "what discharge rate" it gives evidence — rates used, outcomes, when alarms occurred, documented capacity — and then defers. A number presented as an answer gets typed into a control system by someone who trusts it.

It does not answer outside its evidence. Zero rows means "no records found", never an invented figure.

These are code paths, not prompt instructions: api/contracts.py holds one Pydantic contract per class, validated after generation and before returning. A response that fails its contract is regenerated once, then errors. It is never returned. pytest api/tests exercises every rule above without an API key or a database, because that is the point of putting them in Python.

Full detail: BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md §2.


The plant

Waterloo Road Pump Station is a three-pump wastewater station.

  • Wet well WW-101, 07000 mm, 120 m³ per metre of level
  • Pumps PU-301/302/303, duty/assist/assist, ~120 L/s each against 22 m static lift, on a common VSD speed reference clamped 3850 Hz
  • Spill weir crest at 6000 mm, LSHH-102 at 5500 mm, high level alarm at 5200 mm, stop-all at 1000 mm
  • Control logic runs on openplc-runtime; Yokogawa CI Server on cicore1 polls it over Modbus TCP and historises the result

The unit trap that will catch you: the PLC works in millimetres and litres per second; the historian stores percent of the weir crest (raw mm ÷ 60) and m³/h. Every conversion is recorded per tag in db/seed/tags.csv, which also records — in capitals, at the start of each description — whether a tag is historised at all. Field inputs to the PLC (%IW/%IX: vibration, thermal, discharge pressure) are not published to SCADA and have no history. An answer that trends PU-301 vibration is fabricating data.

Source of truth for the plant: WRPS/01-design-doc/, WRPS/04-plc/register-map.csv and WRPS/05-scada/modbus/scada-points.csv in the WRPS repository.


Architecture

operator ──► Caddy ──► Authelia (AD + Duo) ──► ai-web ──► ai-api
                                                            │
                            ┌───────────────────────────────┼──────────────┐
                            ▼                               ▼              ▼
                      classifier                          Cube        pgvector
                   (CHEAP_DEPLOYMENT)                       │          (pg-ai)
                            │                               ▼
                    one branch per class              imh (SQL Server,
                            │                          read-only, TDS/1433)
                            ▼                          ── PENDING ──
                     contract validation
                            │
                            ▼
                        Langfuse

Everything runs on yau-sls-poc-lin001 (10.0.0.17), a shared, live Docker host that already runs 22 containers including openplc-runtime — the PLC for this demo. See YAU_Linux_Host_Onboarding.md.

There is no replication job and no mirror table. imh is already an isolated copy of the raw SCADA historian, so Cube queries it directly with a read-only login. pg-ai holds pgvector chunks, Cube pre-aggregations, and the equipment/tag reference data.

Container Stack Networks Public URL
pg-ai pgvector/pgvector:pg16 ai-internal only none
cube cubejs/cube (pinned) ai-internal + proxy cube.yokogawa.tech
cubestore cubejs/cubestore (pinned) ai-internal only none
ai-api Python 3.12 + FastAPI ai-internal + proxy api.yokogawa.tech
ai-web Vite build → nginx:alpine proxy ai.yokogawa.tech
ai-ingest Python 3.12, on demand ai-internal none
ai-docs-worker same image, long-running (Phase 9) ai-internal none
langfuse + lf-db official images ai-internal + proxy lf.yokogawa.tech

Rebuild from zero

Assumes: a checkout at ~/ai on lin001, and the Caddy + Authelia + proxy stack already running (it is — this host has served demos for months).

1. Secrets

Three 0600 env files under ~/ai/, never in Git. Every key is listed with no values in .env.example.

mkdir -p ~/ai && cd ~/ai
install -m 600 /dev/null pg-ai.env
install -m 600 /dev/null api.env
install -m 600 /dev/null langfuse.env

Follow the ~/authelia/authelia.env precedent. The Grafana admin password sitting in plain text in ~/docker-compose.yml is a known defect on this host, not a pattern to copy.

2. Phase 1 — pg-ai

./scripts/deploy.sh phase1

Creates /datadisk/pg-ai, starts pg-ai, applies the schema and roles, loads equipment.csv and tags.csv with their alias arrays, and — while USE_FIXTURES=true — loads the fixture stand-in for imh.

Three roles come out of this, and the split matters: agent_ro for the answer path (SELECT only, everywhere), cube_rw for pre-aggregations, and ingest_rw — the only role that writes doc_chunks. Set all three passwords in the 0600 env files; INGEST_DB_USER / INGEST_DB_PASSWORD are what Phase 3 connects with, and Phase 3 refuses to start without them.

Gate: pg-ai healthy, vector present, agent_ro can SELECT and cannot INSERT, ingest_rw can write doc_chunks and nothing else, every equipment item and tag has an alias, pg-ai publishes no host port and is not on the proxy network, and df -h / is unchanged. ./scripts/verify.sh checks all of it.

3. Phase 2 — Langfuse

./scripts/deploy.sh phase2

Deployed early on purpose: from here on, every experiment is traced. Then do the manual steps the script prints — DNS, Caddyfile, Authelia rule, announce the Authelia restart.

4. Phase 3 — knowledge base

Put the controlled documents on the host, in the folders that determine doc_type:

/datadisk/ai-docs/{procedures,manuals,rationalisation,design}/
docker compose -f ~/ai-compose.yml run --rm ai-ingest --all

It will ask you to confirm the document number, revision and effective date for every file. Confirm them properly. A wrong revision on a procedure is a safety issue, not a data-quality one. When a new revision lands:

docker compose -f ~/ai-compose.yml run --rm ai-ingest --supersede WRPS-OPS-014 4

That sticks. Re-ingesting a superseded document brings it back superseded, and --all skips it — the flag is not reset by replacing chunks. To undo one:

docker compose -f ~/ai-compose.yml run --rm ai-ingest --restore WRPS-OPS-014 3

This is the SSH path, and it stays. Phase 9 adds the same thing as a screen, so that an operator who is issued a new document when the PLC logic changes does not have to find someone with a host login. It does not remove the header confirmation or the supersede decision — it puts them in front of a named person and records the answer. See step 8 below.

5. Phase 4 — imh ⚠ PENDING

The only true blocker. Start the conversation now; do not wait for Phase 3. Agree the read-only login, the table names and key columns, the timestamp semantics, and an NSG rule allowing lin001imh on 1433 only. Then update §10 of BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md with the real schema and change db/002_fixtures.sql and the Cube models to match.

Until then everything runs on fixtures, and every answer carries a fixture banner all the way to the operator's screen.

The three Phase 5 findings are fixed (2026-08-31), against the SCADA configuration rather than against the fixtures. All three came from one substitution: the stand-in historian was keyed on CI Server point names (PS_STN_WET_WELL_LEVEL) when the historian is keyed on CI Server item names (AID.WRPS.STN.LEVEL) — two layers apart, not one. Nothing is aliased across that gap now: public.historian_items holds the mapping, generated from WRPS/05-scada/modbus by scripts/gen_historian_items.py, and an item that resolves to neither a tag nor a written reason is a build error rather than a silent "no records found".

Two consequences worth knowing before you read a number off this system:

  • The historian keeps seven days. Every WRPS history group is LIFE_TIME "1 weeks", and the fixtures now match, so a question about last month fails here exactly as it would against imh. Zero rows outside retention is reported as a retention limit, never as "nothing happened".
  • Equipment is asserted in exactly one place, tags.equipment_id. The history carries no equipment column, because CI Server's section tree stops at the station and the three pumps and has no wet well to put there.

Full detail in BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md Phase 4, "Resolved 2026-08-31". Eval cases H26, H27 and H31 cover them, and H29 covers the retention limit.

6. Phases 57 — Cube, API, UI

./scripts/deploy.sh api      # cube + ai-api
./scripts/deploy.sh web      # ai-web
./scripts/verify.sh

Each prints the manual DNS/Caddy/Authelia steps.

DNS is done as of 27 August 2026: ai, api and cube all resolve to 20.211.144.151, and the DC carries the pinpoint record ai.yokogawa.tech10.0.0.17 that the Azure hairpin requires. The Caddyfile blocks and Authelia rules for the three names still have to be applied on the host — until they are, the names resolve and nothing answers.

The operator console is unauthenticated, and only from the SCADA machine. Applied 28 August 2026 at the customer's direction. The ai.yokogawa.tech Caddy block admits remote_ip 10.0.0.21 (yau-poc-cicore1, static) and returns 403 to everything else — LAN, VPN and internet alike. An operator at the console should not complete a Duo push to ask a question; nobody outside the plant should reach the assistant at all.

Read this before relying on it. It is an IP allowlist on a flat network with no OT/IT boundary: anything that can take 10.0.0.21 inherits unauthenticated access. It is a demo affordance, not a security control, and it is listed as such in BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md §14. It also makes Langfuse traces anonymous — there is no longer a record of who asked what — and it puts the assistant out of browser reach over the VPN, so engineers need an SSH tunnel. api.yokogawa.tech is unchanged and still fully gated; Phase 9 document publishing depends on that and must stay there. Rollback is a Caddy reload — the Authelia rule was left in place on purpose. See caddy/ai-routes.caddy.

This is in scope for the §2 OT/safety review, which is still outstanding.

api.yokogawa.tech has no pinpoint record and does not resolve inside the VNet. That is why the Phase 7 Caddy block routes /ask under ai.yokogawa.tech to ai-api and the page is same-origin: a cross-origin build loads on a control-room PC and then fails every question on DNS. Only /ask is routed there — see the warning in caddy/ai-routes.caddy before widening it.

7. Phase 8 — validate

python eval/run_eval.py --api https://api.yokogawa.tech

62 engineer-reviewable cases in eval/testset.jsonl, every data-dependent one with a pinned time windowimh is live, and an unpinned question gives a different answer each run.

Gate: ≥85% overall, ≥95% classification accuracy on Procedural and Advisory, zero contract violations, p95 under 12 s. run_eval.py returns non-zero if any of those is missed. It also marks Historical and Advisory cases needs_review: whether "6" is the right number is a judgement for an engineer with access to imh, not something this script can decide.

8. Phase 9 — operator document upload

BUILT AND LIVE 2026-08-28, ahead of Phase 8, at the customer's direction. The screens are at https://api.yokogawa.tech/documents — served by ai-api, not ai-web, because ai.yokogawa.tech is now SCADA-only and carries no identity at all. Upload → convert → review → approve, plus withdraw and restore. The pool screen was explicitly descoped.

Files are converted to text with pypdf / python-docx / openpyxl and the converted text is shown to the reviewer before approval — the raw file is never what the assistant reads, and a bad conversion is meant to be caught by eye. Scanned documents cannot be read and are refused rather than stored empty.

Two things to know before trusting it. Identity is self-asserted: the publisher is a typed name checked against a one-entry list (admin) with no password, so anyone who reaches the page can claim it. Rows are marked demo:<name> / DEMO-UNVERIFIED so they stay distinguishable from authenticated ones later. And the two ingest paths must not be used on the same document — files published through the UI stay in the inbox and ai-ingest --all cannot see them. Full list of divergences in BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md §14.

The design below is what §16 specifies, and remains the target.

After Phase 8 passes, not before. When the PLC logic or the SCADA program changes, a new document is issued and the assistant is wrong about the plant until it is ingested. Today that needs SSH to a live shared host. Phase 9 puts it behind the UI:

upload  ─►  pre-scan  ─►  review  ─►  approve  ─►  published
(anyone    (worker,      (a named    (header      (chunks
 with 2FA)  Docling)      publisher)  confirmed)   citable)

Nothing is citable until a named person in AI_DocPublishers has confirmed the document number, revision and effective date, and decided what it supersedes — the same questions ingest.py asks at a terminal, asked on a screen and, unlike the terminal, recorded. The database refuses an approved row without them.

psql -h pg-ai -U postgres -d plant -f db/004_doc_uploads.sql
psql -h pg-ai -U postgres -d plant -f db/005_doc_actions.sql
psql -h pg-ai -U postgres -d plant -f db/006_doc_pool.sql
sudo install -d -o 10002 -g 10002 /datadisk/ai-docs-inbox   # check df -h first
sudo install -d -o 10002 -g 10002 /datadisk/ai-docs-withdrawn
docker compose -f ~/ai-compose.yml up -d ai-docs-worker

Taking documents out is the other half, and today there is no way to do it: --supersede needs a revision to keep, so a cancelled procedure or a manual for equipment that has been removed cannot be withdrawn at all. Phase 9 adds withdraw (immediate, reversible, keeps the chunks and the audit trail — this is what "remove it" almost always means), restore, and purge (deletes, irreversible, off unless ALLOW_PURGE=true and the publisher types the document number). All three need the publisher group and a written reason, and all three are recorded in doc_actions, which nothing can delete from.

Withdrawal also moves the file out of /datadisk/ai-docs into an archive, so that folder keeps meaning "the documents this plant runs on". That is housekeeping, not the safety mechanism: ingest.py reads a document's withdrawal state before replacing its chunks and carries it through, and --all skips withdrawn documents — so re-ingesting cannot resurrect one, whatever folder it is in. --restore DOC_NUMBER REVISION is the way back, and it refuses while another revision of the same document is live.

Then the manual steps: the copy_headers change on the api.yokogawa.tech Caddy block, the ^/docs/.* Authelia rule above the general one, and AI_DocPublishers in AD with direct membership.

Design and gate: BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md §16 and Phase 9. Two gate items matter most. A user who is authenticated but not a publisher must get a 403 from the API, tested by calling api.yokogawa.tech directly — the button being hidden proves nothing. And after withdrawing a document, ai-ingest --all must not bring it back; run it and check, because that is the failure that puts a withdrawn procedure back in front of an operator.

Choosing what is in the pool is a third, separate thing, and it is separate on purpose. superseded says this document is withdrawn or replaced — a claim about the document, with a reason and an audit row behind it. pool_enabled says this document is part of the set we are running with — a claim about the corpus, and no comment on whether the document is current. Retrieval requires both, so putting a withdrawn document back in the pool does not make it citable. A superuser curates the pool to keep it current; the same screen saves named profiles.

For demos, POST /ask takes an optional pool_profile that narrows retrieval for that one request and changes nothing stored — so "three documents versus forty-seven" needs nothing undone afterwards on a host other people are using. Every answer from a reduced pool carries a banner with the document count, in the same place and for the same reason as the fixture-data banner: an answer from a trimmed corpus is otherwise indistinguishable from a complete one. The demo worth showing is not "more documents, better answers" — it is that with the evidence removed the assistant says no governing procedure in the active document set, rather than degrading into something plausible.

Read the HNSW note at the top of db/006_doc_pool.sql before rehearsing that demo. The index covers every embedding and filters afterwards, so a heavily trimmed pool can appear to collapse retrieval entirely.

What none of it does: update tags.csv, the Cube models or any setpoint. A new design document changes what the assistant can cite; the numbers behind Historical and Advisory answers still come from reference data that is changed in Git and deployed. The review screen asks the reviewer to confirm they know that, because a document going live while the tag metadata behind it has not is a gap that is only visible at that moment.


Working on it

pytest api/tests          # contracts, classifier rules, SQL allow-list. No network.
  • The host is live and shared. Prefer additive changes. Snapshot config before editing. Announce anything that restarts Caddy or Authelia — it logs out every active user, including whoever is mid-demo.
  • Never restart, update or reconfigure openplc-runtime as a side effect of AI work. It is the PLC for the demo plant. Its published port 502 is the one deliberate exception to the no-published-ports rule on this host, and it does not generalise to anything we build.
  • Verify, don't assume. docker ps showing "Up" is not proof.
  • Test every layer without the LLM first. Prove Cube returns the right number by hand. Prove retrieval finds the right procedure by hand. Then wire up the agent — otherwise a wrong answer has four possible causes.
  • Do not invent schema. Inspect, or ask.
  • Fix eval failures in the classifier, Cube and ingestion — not by adding instructions to the prompt. When something fails, add the failing case to eval/testset.jsonl before fixing it.

Repository layout

CLAUDE.md                    short rules — what Claude Code keeps front of mind
workflow-map.html            the non-technical explainer — how a question becomes
                             an answer, and what is built. Open it in a browser
BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md       the build spec
YAU_Linux_Host_Onboarding.md the host brief (reference; wins on conflict)
compose/                     deployed to ~/ai-compose.yml and ~/langfuse-compose.yml
caddy/ai-routes.caddy        blocks to paste into ~/Caddyfile
authelia/access-rules.md     the rule additions as text — never the real config
db/                          schema, roles, fixtures, and the alias seed CSVs
cube/model/                  alarms, process values, operations, equipment
api/                         FastAPI, classifier, agent, contracts, guardrails
ingest/                      Docling → chunk → embed → pg-ai, plus the
                             Phase 9 upload worker
web/                         React + Vite operator UI
eval/                        62-case test set and the scorecard runner
scripts/                     deploy.sh, verify.sh
docs/                        GITIGNORED — real content on /datadisk/ai-docs

Known shortcuts

Deliberate, documented, and not to be shipped. Full list in BUILD-AI-CONTAINERS.md §14. The ones that matter most:

  • Secrets in 0600 env files, not a vault
  • No OT/IT firewall boundary — one flat 10.0.0.0/24 PoC network
  • Modbus TCP on port 502 with no authentication or encryption, contained by NSG/VPN scope only — confirm the NSG does not expose it to the internet
  • Single host, no HA: lin001 is a single point of failure for both the demo estate and the simulated plant's PLC
  • No automated backup — pg-ai needs adding to whatever backup exists
  • Document revision metadata entered semi-manually, not integrated with document control — Phase 9 records who asserted a revision, which is not the same as knowing what the current one is
  • Uploaded documents are not malware-scanned; type and size checks only

Section 2 of the build spec must be reviewed with an OT/safety representative before any operator sees a demo.